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ABSTRACT
Due to the financial crisis and the increase in the unemployment rate, 
active labour market policy (ALMP) inevitably returned to the forefront 
with its “activation strategy”. The research challenge of the article is ana-
lysing the effectiveness of ALMP in the period 2007-2013. The method-
ology of the work is panel regression with fixed effects estimation. The 
model estimates the effect of the two largest programs of the ALMP, 
Training and Employment Incentives, on Employment Rate, considering 
six additional control variables with potential effect on the labour mar-
ket. The results demonstrate a positive impact of the Training program 
on the Employment Rate even in the time of crisis. In contrast, the Em-
ployment Incentives program had, along with Passive Labour Market Pol-
icy (PLMP), a somewhat negative impact on Employment Rate. The find-
ings provide an insight into the nature of ALMP’s implementation during 
the financial crisis. While the training programs keep their active nature, 
the employment incentives become reactive and to a certain degree act 
as a measure of PLMP.
Keywords:	 effectiveness,	Employment	Incentives	program,	employment	rate,	finan-
cial	crisis,	Training	program,	unemployment,	EU,	labour	market
JEL:	E240,	J480,	J080	
1 Introduction
The problem of unemployment is one of the biggest issues and one of the 
major challenges the European Union (EU) is facing. Over the past ten years, 
when the global economic crisis occurred and widened, the employment in-
dicator reached its historical minimum in all EU countries (Bánociová & Mar-
tinková, 2017). It led to sharp increases in unemployment in many countries 
and a resurgence in the numbers of long-term unemployed (Martin, 2014). 
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The range of various programs and measures that EU countries directly and 
selectively intervene in the labour market in order to reduce unemployment 
and increase employment can be classified as an active labour market policy 
(Svetlik & Batič in Svetlik et al., 2002). Programs that are designed to help 
unemployed people also help them acquiring the skills they need and that are 
desirable in the labour market (Nie & Struby, 2011).
The main goal of the ALMP is to improve the functioning of the labour market 
for unemployed persons and have them return to work in various ways, 
therefore a high level of employment would be maintained (Svetlik & Batič in 
Svetlik et al., 2002). ALMP usually includes training and education programs, 
employment programs, job creation and others. As a result, it is not only a 
means of social protection but also a tool for economic policies and businesses 
that need to be adapted (Sahnoun & Abdennadher, 2018). Due to the financial 
crisis, ALMP inevitably returned to the forefront with its “activation strategy” 
in order to help reduce unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, 
and help find other risk groups jobs (Martin, 2014). Card, Kluve and Weber 
(2017) found with regard to the state of the labour market that ALMPs tend 
to have larger impacts in periods of slow growth and higher unemployment.
Active labour market policy is intertwined with various macroeconomic indi-
cators, such as unemployment, inflation and GDP, and therefore assessment 
and measurement are very complex. Due to the wide use of ALMP in and 
outside of the EU Member States, the need for measurement and the im-
portance of assessing the achieved performance of its operation is increased. 
However, there is little recent research (from 2008 on) that has evaluated the 
major active labour market policy programs.
The aim of our research is to assess the effect of the two biggest ALMP pro-
grams, namely Training and Employment Incentives, on the Employment 
Rate. The time line covers the financial framework of the European Social 
Fund for the period 2007–2013 in the EU Member States. The methodology 
used is panel regression, which is estimated by the method of fixed effects.
The second chapter deals with a general overview of previous empirical re-
search. The third chapter presents the methodology of the work and the de-
scription of the variables. The research results are presented in the fourth 
chapter. The last chapter follows up the conclusion with a discussion on the 
results of the research in light of the results of previous studies.
2	 Research	on	Effects	of	ALMP	Programs
ALMP programs are complex and operate within a variety of contextual con-
ditions, therefore their evaluation is difficult. Often, the target groups en-
counter large barriers to (re)integration into the labour market. Techniques 
to improve the employability and employment opportunities of the ALMP 
participants are difficult to standardise. Labour market interventions cannot 
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function separately, but only in combination with other policies and programs 
under different structural and economic conditions. Being so, the results are 
difficult to measure in the short term (Bredgaard, 2015). Assessments based 
on microdata show that the effects of the ALMP on employability do not ap-
pear or they are small in the short term. The long-term effects in terms of em-
ployability are generally more visible or expressed (Boone & Van Ours, 2004). 
This encourages research in the long run, including monitoring the employ-
ability of workers and thus monitoring the performance of individual ALMP 
policies (European Union, 2016).
Besides, there are few recent macroeconomics studies that analysed the ef-
fects of ALMP programs, except the research of Escudero (2018). In his re-
search, Bredgaard (2015) even argues that a database that would support re-
search on how ALMP programs actually work is not yet available. Despite the 
data accessibility hindrance, a number of researchers studied the impact of 
ALMP on employment or unemployment rate in the time periods from 1985 
until 2008 (Kluve & Weber, 2009; Kluve, 2010; Heckman et al., 1999; Kluve 
and Schmidt, 2002; Kluve et al., 2002; Card et al., 2010, Nie and Struby, 2011; 
Laporšek and Dolenc, 2011; Boone and van Ours, 2004; Estevão, 2003; Es-
tevão, 2007). For the last two decades, EUROSTAT and OECD (Eurostat, 2016; 
OECD, 2016c) have collected and published comparable data about both Ac-
tive and Passive Labour Market Politics. Surprisingly, there are no macroeco-
nomic studies analysing the period from 2007 to 2013 (seven year long finan-
cial framework of the European Union), even though the data are available 
and insight into the impact of the ALMP in that period is very much needed.
In the rest of the chapter, we present the research framework, methodologi-
cal approach and major results of the studies that we have drawn from in the 
definition of our research design. The overview of the main characteristics of 
the research presented is given in the Table at the end of the chapter.
In their research, Laporšek and Dolenc (2005) studied the relationship be-
tween the programs of Active and Passive Labour Market Policy, labour rela-
tions legislation and lifelong learning programs relating to the Employment 
Rate, the rate of unemployment and the long-term unemployment rate. The 
methodology used in their research was panel regression, and the models 
they used were evaluated with the fixed and random effects model. The anal-
ysis was carried out for twenty EU Member States in the period 1990–2008. 
The analysis showed that expenditure on an active labour market policy was 
positively related to the labour market, thus affecting a reduction in the 
unemployment rate and an increase in the Employment Rate. On the other 
hand, expenditures dedicated to Passive Labour Market Policy (PLMP) neg-
atively correlated with the transition from unemployment to employment. 
Their research brought attention to the importance of creating a balanced 
employment policy for the further development of the European labour mar-
ket and the economy (Laporšek & Dolenc, 2011).
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Boone and van Ours (2004) examined the effectiveness of ALMP at the aggre-
gate level. They analysed (with analysis of time series) the effects of the ALMP 
(Training and Employment Incentives) programs on the employment-popula-
tion rate and the unemployment rate in twenty OECD countries for the peri-
od 1985–1999. They found that the expenditures for the Training program 
provide a significant positive impact on the labour market. Furthermore, they 
observed that the expenditures of public employment services had a certain 
impact on unemployment but had no effect on the Employment Rate of the 
entire population, whereas the Employment Incentives programs were not 
successful at all.
In his research, Estevão (2003) analysed panel data for 15 industrial countries, 
employing the ordinary least square model. He found that in the 1990s the 
most successful program was the subsidy for direct job creation. However, 
that was not the case in the 1980s, when the expenditure for the ALMP was 
relatively smaller. Training programs had largely proved to be unsuccessful in 
terms of intended expenditures. In a subsequent study, the same author (Es-
tevão, 2007) analysed data under the same research strategy for the same set 
of countries in the period from 1985–2000, observing several different periods 
of years and different set of independent variables used (see Table 1). He con-
cluded that the ALMP as a whole had a statistically significant positive impact 
on the Employment Rate. The most successful programs were subsidised em-
ployments programs, while the Training programs did not show statistically sig-
nificant influence. Moreover, the Labour market services showed a statistically 
significant negative impact on the Employment Rate over the whole period.
Nie and Struby (2011) formulated three fixed effects models for the unem-
ployment rate. They used data for 20 OECD countries for the period from 
1998 to 2008. They found the common ALMP to be cost-effective in reduc-
ing unemployment. Programs were beneficial in the main categories of the 
ALMP, in the Training program and in labour market services (Job-Search As-
sistance). Both programs also had an influence on reduction of the unemploy-
ment rate. Measures covered by the smallest category of the ALMP (other 
policies) (see Table 1) also reduced unemployment. Conversely, Direct Job 
Creation had a negative effect on the unemployment rate and the Supported 
Employment program did not show a statistically significant difference.
Escudero (2018) examined the effectiveness of ALMPs in improving labour 
market outcomes, especially of low-skilled individuals, by means of a pooled 
cross-country and time series database for 31 advanced countries during the 
period 1985–2010. The analysis included aspects of the delivery system to see 
how the performance of ALMPs is affected by different implementation char-
acteristics. Among the notable results, the paper finds that ALMPs matter at 
the aggregate level, but mostly through appropriate management and imple-
mentation. In this regard, sufficient allocation of resources to programme ad-
ministration and policy continuity appeared to be particularly important. More-
over, start-up incentives and measures aimed at vulnerable populations are 
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more effective than other ALMPs in terms of reducing unemployment and in-
creasing employment. Interestingly, the positive effects of these policies seem 
to be particularly beneficial for the low skilled. Training, in contrast, seems to 
be effective for the overall population; however, it also has positive effects for 
the low skilled through the interaction with implementation variables.
Table 1 on the next page summarises previous research, with the complete 
data and the impact of independent variables.
Table 1: Overview of the research on the effectiveness of the ALMP
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Source: Would Active Labour Market Policies Help Combat High U.S. Unemployment? 
(Nie and Struby, 2011), Do Flexicurity Policies Affect Labour Market Outcomes? An 
Analysis of EU Countries (Laporšek and Dolenc, 2011), Effective Active Labour Market 
Policies (Boone and van Ours, 2004), Do Active Labour Market Policies Increase 
Employment? (Estevão, 2003), Labour Policies to Raise Employment (Estevão, 2007), 
Are active labour market policies effective in activating and integrating low-skilled 
individuals? An international comparison (Escudero, 2018)
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3	 Methods
The research presented covers the financial framework of the European So-
cial Fund for the period 2007–2013 in the EU Member States. The aim of the 
research is to assess the effect of the two largest ALMP programs, namely 
Training and the Employment Incentives Program, on the Employment Rate. 
The methodology used is panel regression with fixed effects estimation, as 
used in above mentioned previous research (Nie and Struby, 2011). The vari-
ables used in the research are recapped in Estevão (2003), Estevão (2007) and 
Boone and van Ours (2004).
In the following paragraphs, the general characteristics of panel regression 
modelling and the specific model tailored for the needs of this study, along 
with the description of variables, are presented.
3.1	 Panel	Regression
Panel data has two dimensions, namely a cross-sectional and a time dimen-
sion. When the cross-sectional units have the same number of observations, 
this is called a balanced panel data set. In the case of a different numbers of 
observations, the data set is unbalanced. Panel data provide more informa-
tive data, greater variability, more degrees of freedom, less correlation be-
tween variables and greater efficiency (Verbeek, 2004).
Panel data analysis can be understood as a combination of regression and 
time series analysis. It is based on repetitive patterns of variance, since the 
findings of the units are repeated through the time dimension. By examining 
the repeated intersection of data observation, the panel detects and mea-
sures effects that cannot be detected in a clean section or in a time series 
of data. Since the panel data is taken into account by the dynamics of the 
cross-sectional data recurring over time, the effect of the unmodified vari-
ables can be controlled. When the cross-sectional observations over a long 
period of time are examined, the analysis of panel data provides a better 
explanation of the phenomenon, less collinearity and more efficiency than a 
cross-sectional or longitudinal analysis. Panel regression therefore provides 
us with greater patterns and greater flexibility in data processing and offers 
the possibility of studying heterogeneous phenomena (Verbeek, 2004).
The problem of validity and reliability is an important issue in panel analysis. 
Since the panel data includes both a cross-sectional view and a time dimen-
sion, we are faced with a heteroscedasticity problem with cross-sectional data 
(which can be a consequence of unsuitable merging of groups) as well as auto-
correlation for time series data, where coefficients of variance of coefficients 
and variance of random errors become biased. There are also some additional 
problems, such as cross-correlations in individual units at the same time. All of 
these problems need to be addressed in the analysis (Gujarati, 2004).
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For panel regression evaluation in professional literature, two approaches 
are most frequently used, i.e. the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and the Random 
Effects Model (REM). Being assumed that ui (errors) and Xi (independent vari-
ables) are related, it is more appropriate to use the FEM model. An example 
of such a situation is a random sample of a large number of individuals whose 
salary, earnings of function are modelled. It is assumed that earnings are as-
sociated with education, work experience, etc. εi presents unexplored effects, 
such as innate abilities and family background. When modelling earnings, it is 
therefore likely that errors εi will be associated with education (Gujarati, 2004, 
p. 650).
The term “fixed effects” thus expresses non-coincidental quantities. The 
Fixed Effects Model is appropriate, especially when a random error related to 
individual observation can correlate with one or more independent variables. 
Assuming that the regression coefficient β1 is constant and β2 can be distin-
guished between cross-sections, the Fixed Effects Model with two indepen-
dent variables can be presented in the form of the following formula:
Yit	=	β1i	+	β2X2it	+	β3X3it + uit      (1)
In the formula (1), Yit is the dependent variable of the state i at time t, Xit 
is the vector of the independent variables that change over time and across 
countries. β are unknown coefficients that measure the impact of the explan-
atory variables on the dependent variable, and u presents a random error. The 
index i means the number of repetitions (e.g. countries) and t denotes the 
number of time units (years) (Gujarati, 2004, p. 642).
The Random Effects Model is a hierarchical linear model. It assumes that data 
in analysis are collected from the hierarchy of different populations whose 
differences relate to this hierarchy. Therefore, the average of the individu-
al effects is completely independent of the explanatory variables. This is ex-
pressed in equation (2) below:
β1i = β1 + εi    i = 1, 2, . . . , N    (2)
The term εi means a random error with a mean value of zero and a variance 
σε
2. If, for example, four countries are included in the sample, it is common for 
them that each reflects the mean value β1 and individual differences for each 
country in the expression of error εi.
With the integration of formula (2) into formula (1), we get the formula be-
low:
Yit	=	β1	+	β2X2it	+	β3X3it + εi + uit      (3)
 = β1	+	β2X2it	+	β3X3it + ɯit 
The error term consists of two components εi, which can be either a cross-sec-
tional or individual specific component of error, and uit, which is a combina-
tion of the time series and cross-section component of error. The fact that the 
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composite error term ɯit consists of two (or more) error components derives 
the name of the term components model expresses (Gujarati, 2004, p. 647-
648).
In case T (the number of time series data) is large and N (the number of 
cross-sectional units) is small, it is likely that there will be little difference in 
the values of the parameters that are estimated by the Random Effects Mod-
el and the Fixed Effects Model. In the opposite case, i.e. N is large and T is 
small, the estimates obtained by different models can vary significantly. In 
the Random Effects Model, β1i	=	β1	+	εi and εi is a cross sectional random com-
ponent, whereas in the Fixed Effects Model, β1i is considered to be a fixed 
component. In the latter case, statistical reasoning is conditional on the ob-
served cross-sectional units in the sample. When the cross-sectional units in 
the sample are considered to be random variations, then statistical inference 
is unconditional and the Random Effects Model is more appropriate. When it 
is believed that there are persistent and over time irregular differences be-
tween i, the more appropriate choice for evaluation is the Fixed Effects Model 
(Gujurati, 2004, p. 650).
In case εi and Xi are uncorrelated, the Random Effects Model is more appro-
priate. The assumption in the Random Effects Model is that εi presents a co-
incidence from the entire population. However, sometimes this is not true. 
For example – if we want to investigate the level of crime in fifty USA states, 
it is obvious that in this case the assumption that these fifty countries are a 
random sample is definitely not true (Gujurati, 2004, p. 650).
3.2	 Measuring	Model
As previously mentioned, the analysis of the effectiveness of ALMP programs 
has been carried out using a panel regression model. It is intended for ag-
gregate measuring of effects of the two largest ALMP programs, namely the 
Training program and the Employment Incentives Program, on the Employ-
ment Rate.
As stated in the second paragraph of the next chapter, according to the re-
sult of the Hausman test, it is assumed that εi (ε the expression for the error 
and i presents the number of repetition) and X (independent variables) are 
correlated. Therefore, the Fixed Effects Model is more suitable than the Ran-
dom Effects Model (Gujurati, 2004, p. 642). The model can be written in the 
following formula:
Yit	(ER)	=	βi	+	β1X1it	+	β2X2it	+	β3X3it + β4X4it	+	β5X5it	+	β6X6it	+	β7X7it + β8X8it	+	εit (4)
where Y (dependent variable) is the Employment Rate, βi is constant in the 
number of countries’ repetitions, and β1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8	can vary between cross-sec-
tions. X1 represents the Labour Force Participation Rate, X2 Union Density, X3 
Employment Protection, X4 Tax Wedge, X5 Output Gap, X6 Training, X7 Employ-
ment Incentives and X8	Passive Labour Market Policy. εI	represents term for 
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error. The index i denotes the number of repetitions (countries) and t denotes 
the number of time units (years).
The model is summarised in Nie and Struby (2011) and is adapted to the aim 
of our research. The difference between model specifications in both studies 
is that in our research the dependent variable is the level of work activity, 
while Nie and Struby have used unemployment rate. As could be seen from 
the Table 1, a number of researchers used a very similar approach to us, with 
only slightly different definitions of the work activity (Laporšek and Dolenc, 
2011, Estevão, 2007, Boone and van Ours, 2004, Estevão, 2003).
At the independent variables side, our model also includes variables from 
the previous research (Table 1). It considers a selection from the whole list of 
variables chosen according to the needs of our study. The data was obtained 
from the OECD and Eurostat websites (Eurostat, 2016; OECD, 2016). The vari-
ables forming our measuring model are presented n the next page in Table 2.
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Table 2: Description of variables
Model Variable	 Description	of	variables
Y
Employment 
Rate
Employment Rate is the percentage of the working 
population in the working age population.
X
Labour 
Force 
Participation 
Rate
Labour Force Participation Rate is the percentage of the 
active population in the working age population. The 
working population consists of active employed persons 
and unemployed persons. The working age population 
refers to people aged 15 to 64. 
Union 
Density
Union Density is the relationship between workers that are 
members of union density and those who are not.
Employment 
Protection
Employment Protection is the measure of the strictness 
of the rules on individual and collective redundancies in 
employment contracts. It is expressed as a percentage, 
namely as the ratio between individual and collective 
redundancies.
Tax Wedge
Tax Wedge is defined as the ratio between paid employee 
taxes (at 100 % average earnings) and the associated 
costs for the employer. The average tax wedge measures 
the range from which tax on work income leads to 
discouraging employment.
Output Gap
Output Gap is the difference between actual GDP and 
potential GDP and is expressed as a percentage of 
potential GDP. It is calculated as shown in the formula: 
  Potential GDP is higher than actual GDP.
Training 
program
Expenditures are intended for the Training program, 
which falls within the active labour market policy. Those 
expenditures are public for various programs and 
measures, such as institutional training, workplace training, 
interactive training and special support for internships.
Employment 
Incentives 
program
Expenditures are intended for the Employment Incentives 
program, which falls within the active labour market policy. 
Those expenditures are public for various programs and 
measures, such as employment promotion (permanent 
and temporary employment), incentives that help maintain 
employment, rotations and work division.
Passive 
Labour 
Market 
Policy
Passive Labour Market Policy expenditures are public 
and are intended for Out-of-work income maintenance 
and support in case of job loss as well as for the Early 
retirement program. Expenditures are expressed as a 
percentage of GDP.
Source: Politika trga dela (Jacović, 2010), Labour market policy statistics; 
Methodology 2013 (European Union, 2013), Aktivno in neaktivno prebivalstvo, 
Slovenija (Svetin & Osvald, 2016, pp. 2- 3), Employment rate (OECD, 2016), Labour 
force participation rate (indicator) (OECD, 2016a). Economic Outlook No 100 – 
November 2016: Output gaps: deviations of actual GDP from potential GDP as % of 
potential GDP (OECD, 2016b), Public spending on labour markets (OECD, 2016c), 
Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals (regular 
contracts) (OECD, 2016d), Tax wedge (2016e), Trade Union Density (2016f).
(Actual GDP − potential GDP)
potential GDP .
Central European Public Administration Review, Vol. 16, No. 1/2018 43
Impact of Active Labour Market Policy Programs on Employment in the EU During the Crisis
The previous studies cover different sets of countries over different time pe-
riods (Table 1). Our set of countries is in accordance with Laporšek and Dolenc 
(2011), who used data for twenty EU Member States. As mentioned before, 
our study comprises the until now uncovered time period from 2007 to 2013 
and presents the financial framework of the European Social Fund, while at 
the same time the time of the financial crisis is also taken into account.
In conclusion, we present the final formula of the measurement model (5), 
which includes an independent and eight dependent variables:
ERit
= βi + β1(LFPR)it + β2(UD)it + β3(EP)it	+	β4(TW)it + β5(OG)it + β6(Tr)it + β7(EI)it + 
			β8(PLMP)it	+	εit        (5)
where ER (Employment Rate) is the dependent variable and LFPR (Labour 
Force Participation Rate), UD (Union Density), EP (Employment Protection), 
TW (Tax Wedge) OG (Output Gap), Tr (Training), EI (Employment Incentives) 
and PLMP (Passive Labour Market Policy) are independent variables. The im-
pact of independent variables on the Employment Rate is estimated with the 
fixed effects panel regression model in the country i and year t.
4	 Results
As presented at the beginning of the article, the aim of the research was to 
analyse the aggregate effect of ALMP programs Employment Incentives and 
Training on the Employment Rate. To describe the broader situation on the la-
bour market, we included six additional independent variables that had effect 
on the labour market: Employment Protection, Union Density, Labour Force 
Participation Rate, PLMP, Tax Wedge and Output Gap. The panel model com-
prises data in the time span of seven years (2007–2013) for 20 EU countries 
with 131 observations.
The software program package used to analyse the data was Stata/SE 14.0 
for Windows.
Aggregated effects of two ALMP programs and PLMP on the Employment 
Rate were examined using the panel regression fixed effects model. As the 
model showed that independent variables and their residuals are not cor-
related, we also tested the random effects model. It expressed even stronger 
effects than the fixed model, but the Hausman test (P = 0.056) caused us to 
reject the null hypothesis that the appropriate model was random effect. At 
that point and in all further hypotheses testing, we use α-level 0.05. We test-
ed the data model for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using a mod-
ified Wald test for group wise heteroscedasticity in fixed effect regression 
model and a Wooldrige test for autocorrelation. Both null hypotheses that 
there is no heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in our model were reject-
ed. According to Hoechle’s (2007) suggestion, we used a fixed effect estima-
tion with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
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As can be seen in Table 3, a significant portion of the variance in the depen-
dent variable Employment Rate is explained by the independent variables (R2 
= 0.837). The goodness-of-fit is confirmed by a statistically significant F test 
(P = 0.000).
Table 3: Panel regression model characteristics
Fixed-effects regression Number of jobs = 131
Group variable: ID Number of groups = 20
R-sq: F(8, 6) = 73,44
within = 0.8375 Prob > F = 0.0000
ER Coef.
Drisc/Kraay
Std. Err.
t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
UD 0.0199 0.0864 0.23 0.826 -0.1916 0.23136
LFPR 0.8284 0.0730 11.35 0.000 0.6499 1.00695
EP 3.9463 1.1780 3.35 0.015 1.0639 6.82877
TW -0.1510 0.0388 -3.89 0.008 -0.2459 -0.05613
OG 0.1555 0.0818 1.90 0.106 -0.0448 0.35575
Tr 3.8032 0.7653 4.97 0.003 1.9304 5.67589
EI -4.5209 2.3060 -1.96 0.098 -10.1634 1.12157
PLMP -3.7288 0.5954 -6.26 0.001 -5.1858 -2.27180
_cons 5.5060 5.8171 0.95 0.380 -8.7280 19.73988
Source: Authors’ calculations (Statistically significant difference: P |t| < 0.05)
The results indicate a statistically significant effect on Employment Rate for 
five variables. Three variables demonstrate a positive effect: Labour Force 
Participation Rate (t = 11.35, P = 0.000), Employment Protection (t = 3.35, 
P = 0.015) and Training (t = 4.97, P = 0.003). While the two latter variables 
manifest the expected positive influence on Employment Rate, Labour Force 
Participation Rate expresses a somewhat unexpected effect. It would be pre-
sumed that Labour Force Participation Rate does not change much either 
over countries or over time. In the absence of regulation changes or signif-
icant migration flows of labour force, it would slightly decrease because of 
demographic or out-migration changes. On the other hand, a reverse trend 
could be introduced by changes to labour legislation (retirement age, years of 
service) or by in-migration flow. As the situation in different countries is more 
or less different, we would expect only a moderate or no effect of Labour 
Force Participation Rate on Employment Rate. Nevertheless, as the phenom-
enon is out of the scope of our study, we leave the question to be answered 
in future studies.
A negative effect is demonstrated by two variables: Tax Wedge (t = -1.99, 
P = 0.049) and PLMP (t = -7.46, P = 0.000). Along with the expected role of 
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Tax Wedge and PLMP, in light of the research question, we could determine 
that the variable Employment Incentives (t = -1.96, P = 0.098) has a negative 
effect on Employment Rate at α = 0.1. At first glance, the negative impact 
is somewhat surprising. However, in a time of financial crisis, labour market 
changes induce changes in labour programs, whereas a significant part of this 
reaction is simply generated by a higher number of unemployed people. Even 
though the Employment Incentives program is an active labour market policy 
program, in a time of financial crisis, it becomes more passive or rather has a 
reactive role.
Still, as presented above, the variable Training manifests the positive influ-
ence of investment in training on the Employment Rate. Consequently, we 
could conclude that unlike Employment Incentives, which takes up a reactive 
position in a time of financial crisis, Training programs keep their proactive 
nature even in a time of crisis.
5 Discussion
The panel regression analysis was carried out on a sample of twenty EU Mem-
ber states over the period of seven years (2007–2013). Twenty countries 
were included in the analysis, namely Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Unit-
ed Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, Ireland, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Hungary, Finland 
and France. The aim of the analysis was to determine the impact of the two 
largest ALMP programs, Training and Employment Incentives, on Employ-
ment Rate. The analysis was carried out using the Fixed Effects Model. The 
dependent variable in the model was Employment Rate. Eight independent 
variables were included (see Table 3).
The results showed that the consumption intended for the Training program 
had a positive impact on Employment Rate. Therefore, the investment in the 
program would be remunerated, as the Employment Rate could increase. 
This finding is similar to the studies by Boone and van Ours (2004) and Escu-
dero (2018) (Table 1).
On the other hand, the Employment Incentives program has a negative im-
pact on the Employment Rate, significant at the α-level 0.01. Even at the 
α-level 0.1, the negative impact of the Employment Incentives Program on 
Employment Rate is somehow unexpected, as it tied Employment Incentives 
to lower employment. During a time of crisis, it is intended to cover the costs 
of unemployment, where the Employment Incentives program, in addition to 
PLMP, is one of the main financial sources for helping unemployed people.
In contrast to the other studies (Table 1), our research did not provide statis-
tical evidence of the positive impact of ALMP on employment. Because of the 
different direction of the impact of the programs under consideration; in our 
study, the impact of ALMP as a whole was not detected. On the other hand, 
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the analysis of Laporšek and Dolenc (2011) showed that expenditures on an 
active labour market policy are positively related to the labour market, thus 
affecting a reduction in unemployment and an increase in the Employment 
Rate.
However, in different time frames and for different countries, the impact of 
different programs was found to be different. In two studies, Estevão (2003) 
and Estevão (2007) showed that the Training Program had no statistically 
significant effect on employment. Just opposite to our findings in his study 
as the most effective measures was contended the Employment Incentives 
program. Nie and Struby (2011) studied the impact of ALMP programs on un-
employment rate and found that Training programs, along with Job-Search 
Assistance, are efficient in reducing the unemployment rate. They reported 
no impact of Employment Incentives and a negative impact of Direct Job Cre-
ation. Similar evidence manifesting inefficiency of the Employment Incentives 
program is reported by Boone and van Ours (2004). The introduction of the 
doubt in the efficiency of Employment Incentives program could be under-
stand as a step from the evidence given in before mentioned studies to the 
results of our study.
The difference in the results of our study in comparison to the previous ones 
is the negative impact of the Employment Incentives program on Employ-
ment Rate. As other studies over different time frames report quite similar 
results, but opposite to our study, it is highly plau sible that the difference is 
the result of the emergence of the financial crisis.
6	 Conclusion
The challenge of the research was to analyse the impact of the ALMP pro-
grams on the Employment Rate in the EU Member States during the financial 
crisis. The aim of the research was to determine whether the expenditures 
for the pursuance of the ALMP programs had a positive impact on the Em-
ployment Rate in the EU Member States. The panel data model included data 
for twenty EU Member states within the financial framework in the period 
2007–2013.
The answer to the research question was provided using the fixed effect 
panel regression model with Employment Rate as the dependent variable. 
The model indicated that the Training program had a positive impact on the 
Employment Rate, which meant that it maintained its role amongst Labour 
Market Policy measures even in a time of crisis. Supported to a certain extent 
by weaker statistical evidence, we found a negative impact of Employment In-
centives program on Employment rate. Thus, we came to the conclusion that 
in the period of financial crisis, the investments in the Employment Incentives 
program were conditioned by the situation on the labour market.
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To summarise, the results of our research help in understanding the increase 
of the ALMP programs and measures and awareness of the impact of ALMP 
on the level of work activity in the EU. The study therefore provides an insight 
into the achieved success of the implementation of the ALMP programs in 
respect of dedicated expenditures during the financial crisis, which is the ba-
sis for possible improvements in the further implementation of the ALMP. It 
also contributes to comparing the performance of the ALMP between various 
financial frameworks (2004–2006, 2007–2013, 2014–2020) in the EU.
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